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Declassified and
Approved for Release
July 2000

~~SECRET~~ 09 [REDACTED] OCT 70 CITE SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

IMMEDIATE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1. EVENING [REDACTED] OCT, COS SANTIAGO AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PASSED IN
REVIEW ALL SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY SPHERE AND
ANALYZED SOME OF MORE IMPORTANT FACTORS THAT COULD INFLUENCE
MILITARY TO INTERVENE IN CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. [REDACTED]
SPOKE WITH USUAL FRANKNESS, MAKING CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO PRO-
VIDE COS WITH WELL-BALANCED PICTURE OF SITUATION.

2. [REDACTED] CHANCES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
DIRECTED BY ARMY HIGH COMMAND ARE "NOL". [REDACTED] CAN SEE NO
PROSPECTS FOR ANY CHANGE IN SCHNEIDER'S CONSTITUTIONALIST
POSTURE AND BELIEVES THAT LURE OF PROMISED ASUNCION AMBASSADOR-
SHIP IRRESISTIBLE. GENERAL PRATTS SHOULD TO ALL INTENTS AND
PURPOSES BE CONSIDERED SCHNEIDER'S MAN TO WHOM HE FEELS
BOUND THRU PERSONAL LOYALTY AND LONGSTANDING FRIENDSHIP. MUCH
AS PRATTS COVETS ARMY COMMAND, HE WOULD NEVER WALK OVER
SCHNEIDER'S BODY TO GET IT. IN ANY CASE, NEITHER SCHNEIDER
NOR PRATTS HAD SLIGHTEST INTENTION OF BECOMING INVOLVED
INVOLVED

[REDACTED]

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INTO MILITARY VENTURES, WHATEVER THE RATIONALE.

3. [REDACTED]

4. FOR FIRST TIME SINCE COS HAS KNOWN HIM, [REDACTED] ^{D/D} ~~BRD~~
NOT COME OUT WITH ANY RINGING AFFIRMATIONS OF [REDACTED]
UNQUESTIONING LOYALTY TO HIM. INSTEAD CLAIMED THAT ALLENDE
THRU SKILLFUL USE OF MASONRY CONTACTS AMONG [REDACTED]
OFFICERS BEGINNING TO MAKE INROADS. [REDACTED]
BRIEFED [REDACTED] ON COMMUNIST THREAT, IMPARTING
HIS CONCLUSION THAT ONLY MILITARY ^{GOVT} GOLPE COULD SAVE CHILE.
REACTION AMONG [REDACTED] WAS ONE OF STONY SILENCE.

5. [REDACTED] LEFT NO DOUBT THAT HIS ORGANIZATION LACKS
CAPABILITY TO INTERVENT UNILATERALLY, I.E. WITHOUT FULL
ARMY SUPPORT.

6. AS REGARDS [REDACTED] CONSIDERS [REDACTED]
LOST CAUSE [REDACTED] SEVERAL
[REDACTED] WITH [REDACTED] APPROVAL, IN TOUCH WITH ALLENDE.

7. [REDACTED] CONSIDERS ARMY SERIOUSLY PENETRATED BY UNIDAD
[REDACTED]

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POPULAR. MENTIONED THAT

HAD JUST MET WITH FOR THIRD TIME.

8. UNABLE TO NAME ONE SINGLE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER IN SANTIAGO AREA WHO COULD BE COUNTED UPON TO HEED SUMMONS TO ACTION. SPECIFICALLY RULED OUT GENERAL AS FAVORABLY INCLINED. (THIS IMPORTANT SINCE IN SANTIAGO AREA).

9. RIDICULED IDEA OF FREI'S RESIGNATION TO MAKE ROOM FOR MILITARY. CONSTITUTION SPECIFIC THAT MIN INT NEXT IN LINE. MILITARY COULD BE DEPENDED UPON TO INSURE SMOOTH TRANSFER OF POWER TO ALLENDE.

10. COS AND JOINTLY ANALYZED AVAILABLE MEANS TO REMOVE GENL SCHNEIDER AS CINC ARMY. STATED THAT "POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS" HAD RESTRAINED FREI FROM OFFERING SCHNEIDER CABINET POST. ABDUCTION ATTEMPT MIGHT LEAD TO BLOODSHED. SCHNEIDER'S ACCIDENTAL DEATH WOULD RALLY ARMY FIRMLY BEHIND FLAG OF CONSTITUTIONALISM.

11. VALENZUELA HAD MET WITH VIAUX ON TALK WITH VIAUX FIRMLY CONVINCED HE IS GENERAL WITHOUT

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ARMY. TO COS' QUESTION WHETHER PROVISION OF ARMS FOR VIAUX MIGHT BE HELPFUL, [REDACTED] REPLIED: TO ARM WHOM? [REDACTED] CONVINCED THAT VIAUX LACKS SIZEABLE FOLLOWING IN ANY OF KEY UNITS IN SANTIAGO OR ELSEWHERE. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF KEY REGIMENTS IN SANTIAGO AREA SHOULD RISE IN WAKE OF GOLPE ATTEMPT BY VIAUX? [REDACTED] ARMY WITH AIR FORCE HELP WOULD CRUSH ATTEMPT.

12. AS REGARDS AIRFORCE, [REDACTED] OPINED IT TOO COULD BE WRITTEN OFF. BELIEVES THAT AIRFORCE WOULD NOW FOLLOW ORDERS GIVEN BY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN RUIZ WHO AVOWED ALLENDE ADHERENT.

13. COS PRESSED [REDACTED] FOR CLEAR ANSWER WHETHER SITUATION AS DESCRIBED BY HIM WAS TEMPORARY. HIS REPLY: IT IS TEMPORARY AND IT IS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY.

14. [REDACTED] REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT ARMED FORCES WILL PRESERVE COHESION ONLY AS LONG AS THEY CAN MAINTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL STANCE. ONCE THAT STANCE ABANDONED, ALL HELL WOULD BREAK LOOSE, WITH SOLDIERS FIGHTING SOLDIERS. WAS THAT DESIREABLE? COS REPLIED, U.S.G. DID NOT REALLY CARE AS LONG AS RESULTING CHAOS DENIED ALLENDE THE PRESIDENCY.

[REDACTED]

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15. ~~REDACTED~~ DISCOUNTED EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING ATTEMPTS FOR WHICH VIAUX HAD ADMITTED AUTHORSHIP. THEY HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT CAUSE A RIPPLE.

16. COS ASKED ~~REDACTED~~ IF HE BELIEVED ARMED FORCES TO BE IN ANY DOUBT ABOUT U.S.G. POSITION. ~~REDACTED~~ REPLIED THAT U.S. PREFERENCE FOR MILITARY SOLUTION GENERALLY TAKEN FOR GRANTED. WAS IT OR COULD IT BECOME DECISIVE FACTOR IN MAKING UP THE MINDS OF KEY OFFICERS? ~~REDACTED~~ IT IS GOOD TO KNOW.

17. FOR ~~REDACTED~~ BENEFIT, COS REITERATED U.S.G. POSITION AS ONE OF UNRESERVEDLY (CABALMENTE) SUPPORTING MIL COUP. SHORT OF OPEN INTERVENTION, U.S.G. PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING NEEDED TO GET ARMED FORCES MOVING AND TENDER SPECIFIC ASSURANCES FOR POST TAKEOVER-PERIOD. ~~REDACTED~~ TOOK NOTE AND PROMISED TO BE IN TOUCH IF HELP NEEDED.

18. ~~REDACTED~~ PROMISED TO PASS ON OUR MESSAGE TO THOSE CLOSEST TO HIM. WHEN TAKING LEAVE, ~~REDACTED~~ ASKED COS TO CARRY AWAY NO DOUBTS ABOUT HOPELESSNESS OF SITUATION. COS PROMISED TO CONVEY ~~REDACTED~~ VIEWS, EXACTLY AS STATED, TO HIS SUPERIORS. ~~REDACTED~~

~~SECRET~~